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©Jim Hamlyn, 2017. FOR REFERENCE USE ONLY. For bibliographical information please consult the author.  	 Conquest	of	Photography:	A	Tale	of	Abstraction	Versus	the	Richness	of	Images.		
Jim	Hamlyn	Presented	at	the	2nd	Symposium	Of	Contemporary	Photography,		Regensburg,	Germany	on	the	27th	October	2017.			I’d	like	to	begin	by	discussing	a	recently	published	book	By	Robert	Hariman	and	John	 Lucaites	 entitled	 “The	 Public	 Image”	 (2016).	 A	 recurrent	 and	 no	 doubt	calculated	concern	of	this	book	is	its	determination	to	counter	the	reductive	and	sometimes	 moralistic	 analysis	 of	 much	 late	 20th	 Century	 criticism	 of	photography;	most	notably	exemplified	by	 the	work	of	Susan	Sontag,	who	they	describe	as	“the	central	author	of	twentieth-century	discourse	on	photography.”	Many	 of	 the	 arguments	 in	 this	 book	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 familiar	 to	 anyone	 with	moderate	knowledge	of	photographic	discourse,	but	there	are	also	points	where	Hariman	 and	 Lucaites	 contribute	 new	 and	 illuminating	 observations.	 One	 of	these	comes	towards	the	end	of	the	book	where	they	invoke	Paul	Feyerabend’s	posthumously	published	“Conquest	of	Abundance:	A	Tale	of	Abstraction	Versus	the	Richness	of	Being”	(2001),	from	which	the	title	of	this	presentation	has	been	derived.	In	this	book	Feyerabend	contends	that	our	preoccupation	with	abstract	categories	has	a	tendency	to	blind	us	to	the	abounding	variety	and	complexity	of	the	 world.	 So	 where	 critics	 of	 photography	 see	 an	 unshackled	 and	 excessive	medium,	 Hariman	 and	 Lucaites	 point	 out	 that	 we	 might	 equally	 observe	 its	unlimited	richness	and	potential	for	expression	and	critical	insight.	This	is	a	vital	point,	 but	 it’s	 also	 important	 to	 add	 that	 any	 given	 resource—whether	 it	 be	photography,	oil	or	food—is	only	excessive	or	abundant	within	a	wider	context	of	comparative	examples;	or	a	“stage”	as	Feyerabend	puts	it.	And	as	Hariman	and	Lucaites	also	intimate,	when	photography	is	compared	with	language,	on	a	stage	furnished	and	arranged	according	to	abstract	 linguistic	principles,	the	defective	party	is	invariably	found	to	be	photography.		So	 the	 aim	 of	 this	 presentation	 is	 to	 bring	 into	 relief	 the	 degree	 to	which	 our	language-centric	view	of	the	world	obscures	our	understanding	of	photography	and	depiction	more	generally.	Or,	as	Wittgenstein	put	it:	“Philosophy	is	the	battle	against	the	bewitchment	of	our	intelligence	by	means	of	language.”		Despite	their	laudable	intentions,	there	are	times	when	Hariman	and	Lucaites	fall	prey	to	some	of	the	same	confusions	that	they	elsewhere	criticise.	For	example,	at	several	points	they	define	photography	as	“a	small	language”	because	it	is	has	“only	 the	 most	 rudimentary	 syntax,	 and	 [is]	 otherwise	 lacking	 most	 of	 the	semantic	 and	 artistic	 resources	 of	 literature	 and	 other	 arts.”	 The	 reason	photography	 lacks	 syntax	and	semantics	 is	because	 it	 isn't	 really	a	 language	at	all,	 let	alone	a	diminutive	one.	 Images	are	a	 form	of	communication,	but	unlike	any	 language	 large	 or	 small,	 they	 do	 not	 depend	 upon	 the	 acquisition	 and	deployment	 of	 linguistic	 rules	 and	 conventions—conventions,	 yes,	 but	 not	linguistic	 ones.	 It	 is	 odd	 then,	 that	 Hariman	 and	 Lucaites	 make	 this	 claim,	
©Jim Hamlyn, 2017. FOR REFERENCE USE ONLY. For bibliographical information please consult the author.  	especially	when	at	other	points	they	rightly	observe	that:	“Visual	images	are	not	texts”,	“Showing	is	not	telling”	and	“Photographs	are	indeed	mute	fragments”.		In	 some	 ways	 it’s	 understandable	 that	 photography	 is	 commonly	mischaracterised	 as	 a	 quasi-linguistic	 medium.	 After	 all,	 without	 language	 we	would	 lack	 the	 conceptual	 categories	 and	 analytical	 tools	 necessary	 to	 discuss	images	and	to	extrapolate	from	them	in	conceptual	terms.	This	is	probably	why	Hariman	and	Lucaites	place	such	a	justified	emphasis	on	informed	spectatorship	and	 interpretation.	Nonetheless,	 it	would	be	helpful	 if	 they	were	 clearer	 about	the	dependence	of	symbolic	meaning	upon	language.	The	interpretation	of	what	an	 image	 simply	 depicts	 requires	 only	 recognitional	 abilities,	 whereas	 the	interpretation	of	what	an	image	means,	is	a	much	more	sophisticated	task.		Now,	it	will	be	helpful	here	to	say	a	little	about	the	concept	of	meaning..When	we	say	that	a	ball	means	"playtime"	to	a	dog,	we	need	not	be	committing	ourselves	to	 the	 belief	 that	 the	 dog	 regards	 the	 ball	 as	 a	 symbol	 of	 playtime.	We	merely	mean	 that	 the	 dog	 knows	 that	 the	 ball	 usually	 accompanies	 playful	 activity.	 In	other	words,	we	take	the	dog	to	be	capable	of	forming	associative	responses	to	things	and	thus	to	know	what	they	mean	in	this	limited	sense.			On	the	other	hand,	the	recognition	of	symbolic	or	what	 is	sometimes	known	as	“semantic”	meaning	requires	abilities	of	a	significantly	higher	order	that	we	take	to	 be	 largely	 (although	 not	 entirely)	 exclusive	 to	 human	 beings.	 Hacker	 and	Bennett	put	it	like	this:		 For	 something	 to	 be	 a	 (semantic)	 symbol,	 it	must	 have	 a	 rule-governed	use.	There	must	be	a	correct	and	an	incorrect	way	of	using	it.	It	must	have	a	 grammar	 determining	 is	 intelligible	 combinatorial	 possibilities	 with	other	 symbols,	which	 is	 elucidated	by	explanations	of	meaning,	 that	 are	used	and	accepted	among	a	community	of	speakers.	(Hacker	and	Bennett	146)		Noble	and	Davidson	also	contribute	an	important	observation	in	this	regard:		 The	 example	 given	 by	 Saussure	 of	 his	 seeing	 a	 ‘natural	 connection’	between	 justice	 and	 balanced	 scales	 depends	 upon	 his	 and	 his	 readers’	shared	 appreciation	 of	 the	 idea,	 which	 can	 only	 be	 elaborated	 through	deployment	 of	 linguistic	 signs,	 that	 ‘justice	 should	 be	 even-handed’…	Thus,	what	looks	like	an	effortless	perception	is	one	built	on	the	back	of	a	lengthy	history	and	education	reliant	on	the	use	of	 language	to	explicate	the	various	meanings	that	allow	the	link	to	be	seen.	(1996	68)		So	what	then	of	the	photographic	image?	Are	photographs	symbols	of	the	world?	In	his	 influential	book	 “Languages	of	Art:	 an	approach	 to	a	 theory	of	 symbols”,	Nelson	Goodman	argues	that	all	representations	are	symbolic.	Several	theorists	(Novitz	 1977,	 Files	 1996,	 Blumson	 2014,	 Hamlyn	 2015)	 have	 pointed	 out	significant	 flaws	 in	 Goodman’s	 reasoning.	 In	 particular	 he	 fails	 to	 distinguish	between	 two	 very	 different	 sorts	 of	 resemblance.	 Some	 things	 resemble	 one	another	 because	 they	 share	 properties	 in	 common,	 whereas	 other	 things	 only	
©Jim Hamlyn, 2017. FOR REFERENCE USE ONLY. For bibliographical information please consult the author.  	resemble	one	another	by	way	of	illusion	or	illusionistic	techniques.	I	will	return	to	this	point.		In	an	essay	entitled	“Critique	of	the	Image”	(1970)	Umberto	Eco,	writes:		 Now	a	simple	phenomenological	 inspection	of	any	representation,	either	a	 drawing	 or	 a	 photo,	 shows	 us	 that	 an	 image	 possesses	 none	 of	 the	properties	of	the	object	represented.			For	Eco,	the	relation	between	images	and	“real	phenomena”	is	“wholly	arbitrary”.	But	 this	 is	 surely	 mistaken.	 Words	 like	 “cat”	 certainly	 do	 have	 a	 "wholly	arbitrary"	relation	to	the	things	they	refer	to.	Consequently	there	is	no	question	of	our	mistaking	the	word	“cat”	for	a	four-legged	animal	of	the	feline	variety.	But	if,	 as	 Eco	 claims,	 images	 also	 share	 “none	 of	 the	 properties”	 of	 the	 things	 they	represent,	then	how	is	it	possible	that	we	can	occasionally	mistake	what	turn	out	to	be	images	for	the	things	they	represent?	Eco	offers	no	explanation.	I	suggest	that	if	it	is	true	that	we	can	sometimes	mistake	the	properties	of	one	thing	for	the	wholly	different	properties	of	another,	then	it	 is	reasonable	to	suppose	that	we	must	be	dealing	with	some	form	of	illusionistic	resemblance.		It	would	be	wrong	though,	to	conclude	that	photographs	are	simply	illusions.	As	J.	L.	Austin	comments	“We	might	as	well	ask	whether	producing	a	photograph	is	producing	an	 illusion—which	would	plainly	be	 just	silly.”	Silly	as	 it	might	be	to	ask	 such	 a	 question,	 it	 wouldn't	 be	 silly	 to	 suppose	 that	 we	 could	 use	photographic	techniques	to	construct	an	illusion.	Nor	would	it	be	silly—although	it	might	be	comical—if,	on	occasion,	we	were	to	momentarily	mistake	a	life-sized	photograph	of	a	person	for	an	actual	person,	as	my	son	did	a	year	or	so	ago.	My	point	then	is	this.	Photography	and	other	forms	of	depiction	involve	the	use	of	a	range	of	illusionistic	techniques	which	enable	the	two-dimensional	simulation	of	objects	and	states	of	affairs.		The	Australian	art	theorist	Donald	Brook	writes:		 It	 may	 be	 that	 people	 without	 any	 experience	 of	 pictorial	 simulation	would	 not	 say	 that	 the	 distant	 hills	 look	 blue,	 but	 even	 such	 innocents	would	probably	be	 tricked,	 by	being	 smuggled	 into	 a	 good	planetarium,	into	believing	that	they	were	looking	at	the	open	night	sky.	(Brook	“How	to	Draw	the	Curtains.”	1985)		According	to	Brook,	representational	simulation	does	not	depend	upon	symbolic	rules	 or	 even	 (as	 in	 the	 above	 case)	 on	 its	 necessarily	 being	 recognised	 as	representation	but	on	the	fact	that	we	can	make	perceptual	mistakes	in	certain	regularly	occurring	and	contrivable	circumstances	and	that	the	tendency	to	do	so	turns	out	to	enable	the	felicity	that	we	call	“depiction”.	So	while	Brook’s	innocent	visitors	 to	 the	planetarium	are	not	 aware	 that	 they	are	viewing	an	 illusion,	 the	rest	of	us	usually	are,	 and	 this	 familiarity	 “takes	 the	edge	of	 illusion”	as	Austin	(1960)	 says,	 and	 leaves	 us	 with	 what	 we	 readily	 regard	 as	 illusionistic	techniques;	techniques	that	could,	in	other	more	highly	controlled	circumstances	(like	a	psychology	lab	for	instance),	be	used	to	produce	actual	illusions.	
©Jim Hamlyn, 2017. FOR REFERENCE USE ONLY. For bibliographical information please consult the author.  		Like	both	Goodman	and	Eco,	Vilém	Flusser,	in	his	book	“Towards	a	Philosophy	of	Photography”	 (1983)	 also	 claims	 that	 photographs	 are	 symbols.	 He	 rightly	acknowledges	 that	 “They	 provide	 space	 for	 interpretation”	 but	 he	 fails	 to	observe	 the	 crucial	distinction	 (already	mentioned)	between	 interpretations	of	what	images	are	of	and	interpretations	of	what	they	are	about.	So	whilst	it	is	true	that	photographs	provide	 space	 for	 interpretation	of	what	 they	 are	 about,	 it	 is	much	less	true	that	they	provide	space	for	interpretation	for	what	they	are	of.			Another	 prominent	 late	 20th	 Century	 theorist	 of	 photography,	 Victor	 Burgin	(1982),	echoing	the	sentiments	of	Roland	Barthes,	claims	that:	“images	are	texts”	whilst	Barthes	himself	famously	described	photographs	as	“messages	without	a	code”	(1977).	Burgin’s	category	error	(Ryle	1949)	 is	self-evident,	but	we	might	be	tempted	to	agree	with	Barthes’	seemingly	innocuous	claim.	Let’s	briefly	look	at	the	grammar.	We	commonly	speak	of	what	messages	are	about,	but	it	makes	no	sense	 to	speak	of	what	a	message	 is	of.	On	 the	other	hand,	 it	makes	perfect	sense	 to	 speak	 of	 what	 a	 photograph	 is	 of.	 What	 a	 photograph	 depicts	 is	fundamental	in	a	way	that	its	meaning	is	not.	This	deserves	emphasis.		When	we	speak	of	what	an	image	is	of,	when	we	describe	its	pictured	subject	or	refer	 to	 its	 depictive	 content	 we	 are	 dealing	 with	 what	 might	 be	 called	 its	
primary	representational	features.	Whereas	when	we	speak	of	what	an	 image	 is	about,	 when	we	 discus	what	 it	means	 or	 refer	 to	 its	 symbolic	 content	we	 are	dealing	with	its	secondary	representational	features.	These	secondary	features	are	necessarily	 dependent	 upon	 the	 primary	 features	 because	 without	 these	 there	would	be	nothing	to	interpret	in	the	first	place.		I	 hope	 it	 is	 clear	 from	 these	 observations	 that	 the	 conceptual	 foundations	 of	many	 mainstream	 theories	 of	 photography	 and	 depiction	 are	 confused.	 The	culprit	here	is	the	tendency	to	reduce	nonverbal	representation	to	language.	This	includes	 a	 common	 failure	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 language	 is	 a	 subcategory	 of	communication,	of	which	there	are	other	conceptually	and	procedurally	distinct	categories,	depiction	being	a	prime	example.		I’d	like	to	finish	with	a	few	remarks	about	the	ubiquity	of	photography.	Implicit	in	 this	 notion	 is	 a	 suggestion	 that	 the	 increasing	 availability	 of	 photography	 is	somehow	 suspicious.	 A	moral	 nuisance	 is	 smuggled	 into	 the	 debate.	 It	 is	 as	 if	there	is	something	common,	modish,	simplistic,	disposable,	primitive	and	above	all	 threatening	 about	 photography.	 In	 this	way	 photography	 is	 regarded	 as	 an	uncontrollable	weed	or	parasite	in	the	garden	of	culture.	When	Sontag	wrote	of	photographic	 excess	 she	 was	 thinking	 in	 very	 similar	 terms,	 I	 think.	 She	privileged	 the	 word	 over	 the	 image	 and,	 as	 I	 have	 been	 trying	 to	 show,	 this	tendency—this	 prejudice	 even—obstructs	 our	 understanding.	 Photography	 is	complimentary	 to	 language.	 It	 is	 another	 form	 of	 communication	with	 its	 own	particular	strengths	and	weaknesses.	Yes,	language	massively	expands	the	utility	of	photographs	but	it	does	not	circumscribe	them.		
